 mandating ongoing professional development for financial advisors; and  the introduction of a code of ethics for the industry. 20 The final part of this article considers how these amendments, particularly the requirements for 'provisional relevant providers' to be supervised, might help to reduce the scope for misconduct in the financial services industry.
B. ASIC's other administrative powers in relation to financial services misconduct
In addition to its power to ban individuals under s 920A, ASIC may also suspend or cancel an AFS Licence under s 915C, with such decisions also being reviewable by the AAT. Additionally, as an alternative to pursuing administrative or civil sanctions, ASIC may also accept enforceable undertakings from companies, individuals and licensees under the various legislation it administers. 21 . 22 ASIC's policy on the use of enforceable undertakings is set out in its Regulatory Guide 100, which specifies the factors ASIC will consider when determining the appropriateness its response to identified misconduct or breaches of legislation. 23 Whilst the AAT has previously accepted two enforceable 
C. Factors in determining the justification and length of banning orders
Whilst as Parts III and IV explain, determining the appropriate length of banning orders has proven challenging both for ASIC and for the AAT, the reasoning of Santow J in ASIC v Adler (2002) has provided valuable guidance. In considering the length of disqualifications to be imposed under ss 206C
and 206E of the Act on former directors of HIH, his Honour summarised 15 key propositions from previous case law on the rationale for, and appropriate length of, disqualification orders against persons from managing companies. Whilst emphasising the primary focus of disqualification orders was the protection of stakeholders who deal with companies rather than the punishment of the disqualified individual, His Honour also reasoned that both general and personal deterrence, and preventing future misuse of the corporate structure, were relevant considerations in the imposition of a disqualification order. His Honour also identified factors which may be relevant in the decision to impose short periods of disqualification of up to three years, medium disqualification periods of between seven to twelve years, and lengthy periods of 25 years or more. but concurring judgment in Rich v ASIC (2004 consider when determining whether to take administrative action -either in conjunction with, or as an alternative to, pursuing civil or criminal remedies. These factors include:
 Nature and seriousness of the suspected misconduct;
 Internal controls;
 Conduct after the alleged contravention occurs;
 The expected level of public benefit;  Likelihood that: (i) the person's or entity's behaviour will change in response to a particular action; and (ii) the business community is generally deterred from similar conduct through greater awareness of its consequences; and  Mitigating factors. intermediate bans of between three to ten years; and lengthy bans for periods of ten years or more (including permanent bans).
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As (noting concerns about the possibility that in reviewing the merits of ASIC determinations, the AAT may not be best placed to take account of the broader regulatory objectives that ASIC is aiming to achieve).
reviewing the merits of banning orders made under s 920A, the Tribunal may exercise all of the powers and discretions conferred upon the ASIC delegate as the original decision-maker. Through standing in the shoes of the original decision-maker, the function of the Tribunal is to arrive at the correct or preferable decision based on the material before it, which may include the consideration of fresh material tendered by an applicant or by ASIC.
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The challenges of deriving generally-applicable principles on the justification for, and appropriate durations of disqualification from earlier cases in light of the variations in the circumstances of individual cases have been widely recognised. 40 As discussed in the sections below, these challenges are certainly applicable in the case of s 920A banning orders involving market misconduct -several of which have involved the Tribunals (and in several cases the courts) considering the preferable interpretation of the complex provisions of the applicable legislation. For each decision to remain open for at least one month after the date of the offer. 50 It is also relevant to consider that by introducing the new grounds of being 'involved' in a financial services law contravention through ss 920A(1)(g) and (h), the 2012 amendments to s 920A (reviewed in IA above) might produce a different outcome in response to similar conduct in the future.
B. Misleading investment promotions
In his decision to proceed with these trades demonstrated recklessness as to whether Tricom would be in a position to settle these trades three business days after the transaction was entered into, as required by the ASX Market Rules at the time. 63 In determining this trading to be manipulative, ASIC's delegate imposed a four year ban.
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However the Tribunal took a different view of these transactions, noting that s 1041B(1)(a) focused on appearance of active trading on a financial market -in contrast to the special crossings which were transacted off-market. 65 The Tribunal noted that the special crossings were transacted at prices which markedly differed from the market price at the close of the previous day's trading, and that the change in market price on the next trading day was relatively insignificant and attributable to news regarding the appointment of receivers to Opes Prime. 66 In also noting that Mr Rosenberg sought expert advice before placing the instructions for these trades in the urgent circumstances at the time, 67 Handley DP set aside ASIC's banning order.
III. Variations to s 920A banning orders
In the following cases the lengths of s 920A banning orders were varied after the Tribunals differed in their assessment of the seriousness of the misconduct and/or the need for consumer protection. her clients whilst they were uncontactable overseas, in order to preserve their positions in a superannuation fund pending discussions with them. ASIC considered Ms Dollas-Ford's actions amounted to dishonest conduct under s 1041G, and that she was not of 'good fame and character' for the purposes of s 920B(2). Whilst Senior Member Penglis agreed Ms Dollas-Ford's misconduct had been dishonest, he found her actions did not involve any intent to defraud, and that no losses were experienced by her clients. After noting Ms Dollas-Ford's numerous character references her otherwise unblemished record, and her acceptance of responsibility for her actions, the Tribunal determined there 63 The Tribunal noted that: 'Section 5.7.3 of the ASX Market Rules imposes an obligation on the parties to settle the transaction at a settlement date that is three business days after the transaction was entered into, referred to as T + 3. On this date, the buyer must be in a position to deliver the agreed price for the securities and the seller must be in a position to deliver the beneficial ownership of the securities: [102] was no risk of her engaging in similar misconduct in the future and concluded a reduced ban of four years was appropriate in the circumstances. were found to be manipulative. 71 Forgie DP determined JTMJ's failure to maintain the required records for his trades demonstrated a lack of concern for financial services laws, thus engaging s 920A(1)(f).
A. Minimal need of protecting the consumers from isolated transgressions
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After rejecting JTMJ's arguments about the alternative option of an enforceable undertaking, 73 the
Tribunal concluded a banning order was warranted to protect the public from a repetition of such misconduct. However, after noting that JTMJ's manipulative trading involved only two breaches and one client, his lack of previous contraventions and good community standing, Forgie DP concluded ASIC's ten year ban would have a punitive effect by effectively precluding JTMJ from resuming his career in the financial services industry, and varied the ban to three years. 94 The expert's report had noted that from her review of Mr Hayes' client files, 'There is no attention paid to data collection, needs analysis or risk management issues. I did not see a discussion of binding nominations which should accompany any recommendation to switch into a superannuation fund. There was no financial modelling to show the long-term impact of the switch or that the new fund would better achieve the client's retirement savings amount they required … As there is no basis for the advice being given, no adequate assessment of existing superannuation funds and no matching of a clients preferred portfolio to the investment recommendations, these clients have been put at risk of suffering a loss or not achieving the results they might have achieved had they not switched .. Glenhurst's Approved Products List for promotion to the firm's clients, 102 and that the clients' losses were attributable to these omissions. 103 The Tribunal weighed up Mr Kofkin's proposed enforceable undertaking (involving him being supervised and mentored, and no longer recommending mezzanine finance products similar to those issued by Westpoint), 104 with the factors in favour of a banning order -particularly the significant losses by his clients and the numerous failings in his duties under the former s 945A of the Act. 105 He also noted several clients had remained with Mr Kofkin despite their Westpoint losses; that several character references had shown his otherwise unblemished record and good reputation; that he had taken steps to improve the financial advisory processes at Glenhurst following the collapse of Westpoint; and that he 'was not the only advisor to be caught by the irregular undertakings given by the promoters of the Westpoint products'. 106 After considering the RG 98 guidelines, 107 and acknowledging the financial impact of the ban on Mr Kofkin, and his recognition of his errors, the Tribunal determined the ban should not be so long to 'irrevocably destroy his career', and varied the ban to three years. 112 Secondly, he regarded the Seagrims' failure to disclose commissions and other benefits received from Astarra in its Financial Services Guides 'as a technical matter', given that the SOAs provided to clients disclosed these details. 113 In relation to ASIC's third concern that Seagrims had breached his duties under the former s 945A of the Act through failing to adequately determine their clients' personal circumstances before advising them to migrate their investments into Astarra funds, he noted that many of these individuals were long-standing clients; that the Seagrims were unaware of the fraudulent operation of the Astarra funds at the time; and that they did not gain financially through these alleged breaches. In concluding the Seagrims to have learnt from their experiences, Jarvis DP disagreed with ASIC's contention that they would not comply with financial services laws in the future, and hence found the s 920A(1)(f) banning ground was not established. 115 Taking account of the considerations outlined in
Adler (2002) and RG 98, he determined their breaches were not intentional; the benefits they had received were inconsequential, and that the seriousness of the breaches was grossly disproportionate to the costs they had incurred in assisting their clients.
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, Jarvis DP therefore varied ASIC's ban to six months. 117 The first Tribunal decision to apply the s 961A (which was introduced by the 2012 FOFA reforms) was The more recent case of Amargianitakis and ASIC [2015] AATA 720 involved an unlicensed dealing in financial products by an accountant. One of Mr Amargianitakis' companies (Vista Capital Pty Ltd)
had raised money from clients of his accountancy business (Akis & Associates) to invest in property, mezzanine finance and mortgage lending schemes, with the clients becoming lenders to these projects.
In 2011 both Vista and Akis collapsed in insolvency. 134 The Tribunal noted with concern that Vista had raised around $36 million from financially unsophisticated retail clients of Akis, 135 in respect of whom Mr Amargianitakis did not ascertain their financial objectives or the appropriateness of these loans, nor direct them to obtain independent legal advice. Deputy President Deutsch also rejected Mr Amargianitakis' contention that he had merely offered his clients an investment opportunity; 136 propositions, Deutsch DP found these factors to warrant a longer ban. 140 However he also found factors in favour of a shorter ban including the lack of dishonesty on Mr Amargianitakis' part; his expressions of contrition (and that he had taken steps to improve understanding of financial services regulations.
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After rejecting a proposed enforceable undertaking, which Deutsch DP considered to lack specificity 142 he varied ASIC's eight year ban to six years.
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IV. Section 920A bans that have been affirmed
A. Importance of protecting consumers from serious and/or repeated breaches
In a number of cases the Tribunals affirmed s 920A banning orders imposed for serious and/or repeated breaches of financial services laws, in order to protect consumers from the risk of such misconduct recurring in the future. with poor credit histories into believing that their motor vehicle finance applications would be approved, and through also preparing loan applications without the knowledge or consent of guarantors named in the applications. 145 SM Walsh also noted with concern that for around half of the motor vehicle loans he brokered, Mr Parker arranged unsolicited insurance (for which he gained commissions), which 138 Amargianitakis and ASIC [2015] AATA 720 at [26], [64] 139 Amargianitakis and ASIC [2015] AATA 720 at [66] - [77] 140 Amargianitakis and ASIC [2015] AATA 720 at [99] 141 Amargianitakis and ASIC [2015] AATA 720 at [98] 142 The Enforceable Undertaking that Mr Amargianitakis offered was to '… do all things reasonably required of him to obtain and also to use his best endeavours to obtain a limited AFS license by 30 June 2016 (limited to those items described as "Provide financial product advice" at Table 1 on page 2 of INFO 179) and for the conditions of any such limited AFS License to be that he is subjected to an annual audit or any such conditions as the ASIC imposes': Amargianitakis and ASIC [2015] AATA 720 at [100] 143 Amargianitakis and ASIC [2015] inflated the amounts that clients were obliged to pay for their loans. 146 After finding all of the breaches alleged by ASIC to be substantiated, 147 the Tribunal rejected Mr Parker's expressions of remorse for his conduct; his claim that he was only 24 years old at the time of his misconduct and had been 'naïve and stupid'; and that he had been 'brainwashed' into going along the practices of other brokers in his company. 148 After considering the guidelines in RG 98, the Tribunal concluded his serious and dishonest misconduct to be premeditated and repeated, which had the potential to undermine public confidence in the credit and financial services industries. Panganiban's actions in replacing the insurance policies exposed the clients to avoidable risks including gaps in cover and changes in policy terms, the possibility of extra policy loadings and exclusions, and that it also unnecessarily restarted the non-disclosure period that allows insurers to avoid policies within the first three years of inception for inadvertent non-disclosure. 151 The Tribunal concurred with ASIC's assessment of the seriousness of Mr Panganiban's deliberate and repeated misconduct, 152 and noted that rather than acting in the best interests of his clients, he had been motivated by his own financial selfinterest. 153 Senior Member Taylor concluded that Mr Panganiban's lack of insight into the nature and extent of his misconduct demonstrated that he was 'not of good fame or character', which justified ASIC's permanent banning under s 920A(1)(d). 154 In At the time of its collapse, Provident owed around $201 million to its debenture holders. 164 In a lengthy decision, the Tribunal found that the former Managing Director had been involved in causing Provident to make misleading and deceptive statements in its debenture prospectus to investors about the status of Provident's loan for its major Queensland property development, in contravention of ss 728 and 1041H. 165 In concluding Mr O'Sullivan's conduct had involved 'the repeated camouflaging and (Vic). In imposing a suspended sentence, and noting that all loans had been fully repaid, the County Court judge was satisfied that Mr Howarth was unlikely to re-offend.
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However different considerations applied at the Tribunal hearing. Whilst noting no clients had lost money through his misconduct Deputy President Forgie was concerned by Mr Howarth's concession during that if his practices had not been discovered, he would have continued his fraudulent arranging of such loans. 172 Given the elements of dishonesty in the offences for which he was convicted, Forgie was justified given Mr Howarth's deliberate making of false statements when arranging the loans; 174 his claims that the financiers' forms and practices enabled him to take advantage of them; 175 and his dismissal of the seriousness of his misconduct by emphasising all loans had been repaid. 176 Forgie DP rejected Mr Howarth's proposed enforceable undertaking for twice-yearly audits of his business and his compliance with financial services laws, which she considered would not adequately protect the public, nor uphold public confidence in the ethical operation of the financial services industry. 177 In two cases involving finance brokers the Tribunals affirmed permanent bans imposed under s of making false statements and using false documents for home loan applications, and was sentenced to 350 hours of community service. The total amounts of these home loans was over $7 million, with Mr Sahay's company receiving over $5,000 in commissions for arranging these. 178 Constance DP reasoned that whilst the sentencing magistrate had assessed Mr Sahay's misconduct at the lower end of the scale of criminal seriousness, the different considerations of protecting the public and deterring others from such conduct applied to the Tribunal's considerations. 179 He noted Mr Sahay's misconduct had been deliberate and repeated, continuing until his fraud was discovered by authorities; that it had breached the trust placed in him both by his clients and by lenders; and that as an experienced operator in the credit industry, he ought to have known better. Westpac to support mortgage applications by her clients totalling over $1.6 million -from which she received over $6,000 in commissions. 181 Senior Member Tavoularis held that whilst the Magistrate had imposed a fine of $8,500, the actual penalty imposed was of no relevance to the definition of 'serious fraud' under s 5 of the NCCP Act and s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (which both define 'serious fraud' to mean offences involving fraud or dishonesty which are punishable for a period of at least three months). Rather he clarified that it need only be demonstrated that each of the offences for which the mortgage broker had been convicted carried a possible penalty of imprisonment for a period in excess of three months. 182 In finding her misconduct involved several of the factors listed in Table 2 of RG 98
(and Table 2 of RG 218) justifying lengthy bans, the Tribunal affirmed ASIC's permanent bans.
C. Protecting consumers from serious and/or repeated breaches of financial advice standards
In contrast to the cases involving breaches of financial advice standards reviewed in Part III, in the cases and the suitability of the products he recommended (several of which were not on his firm's Recommended Products List); failed to provide accurate or timely SOAs; that he had breached s 947C(2)(e) in failing to properly disclose the commission payments he would receive for promoting the Dollarforce investments; and that he had pressured several clients to invest. 185 McDonald DP found all these breaches to be substantiated, and found Mr Fuoco's provision of financial advice to fall well short of the former s 945A requirements.
Whilst noting Mr Fuoco had established his own successful financial advisory business since leaving Dollarforce which employed several staff, his references from satisfied clients, and that he had a dependent infant daughter, the Tribunal considered these factors did not outweigh his responsibilities as an Authorised Representative when advising retail clients. McDonald DP also rejected Mr Fuoco's claims of being pressured to sell to his former clients; and also his attempts to attribute his breaches to his former employer's failure to supervise him or have adequate compliance arrangements in place.
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Whilst assessing the likelihood of future breaches by Mr Fuoco to be low, the Tribunal nevertheless emphasised the importance of general deterrence as a significant factor in the imposition of a banning order. 187 McDonald DP rejected Mr Fuoco's proposed enforceable undertaking for regular audits of his business over a two year period as not adequately protecting the investing public. 188 In affirming ASIC's five year ban, Deputy President McDonald dismissed ASIC's argument for a higher ban of ten years, considering such an increase would be excessive and amount to a punishment of Mr Fuoco. and 945B); that he failed to provide SOAs and Product Disclosure Statements; and that through making false or misleading statements (including the expected returns of investments, and convincing riskaverse clients to invest using margin loans), he breached ss 1041E, 1041F and 1041H.
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The Tribunal noted with concern Mr Nguyen's attribution of his predicament to the Global Financial
Crisis and the lack of training and supervision he received from CFP, and his denial that he had breached financial services laws. 192 Mindful of the importance of specific and general deterrence and of upholding public confidence in the financial advisory profession, the [146] conduct reflected the RG 98 criteria justifying a banning in the range of three to ten years. This included his false and misleading conduct being inconsistent with the orderly operation of a financial market (thus undermining public confidence); the significant losses of his clients; his past and current disregard for compliance with the law (including the failure to maintain appropriate records); his failure to have a reasonable basis for his advice to clients; and his failure to disclose his receipt of commissions and other benefits, and relevant interests and associations. 193 In addition to finding s 920A(1)(e) to be enlivened through these numerous breaches, SM Ettinger also found Mr Nguyen's pattern of conduct justified a ban under s 920A(1)(f) -holding that it was not necessary for the Tribunal to be satisfied that Mr Nguyen would breach a financial services law in the future. in Trio-controlled Astarra Capital, without disclosing to his clients that he (together with his wife and one of his companies) had received loans totalling over $500,000 from a director of Astarra Capital, thus breaching s 947C. The ASIC delegate also noted Mr Caines had become bankrupt after the failure of a property development, thereby also enlivening s 920A(1)(bb) as a basis for a banning order. Whilst imposing a permanent ban due to his bankruptcy, the delegate informed Mr Caines of his right to apply under s 920D to vary the ban upon his discharge from bankruptcy. However when Mr Caines applied for a variation to his permanent ban in 2010 upon his discharge from bankruptcy, the delegate determined a five year ban to be appropriate.
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At the 2011 Tribunal hearing, Mr Caines submitted that given his otherwise unblemished record, the five year ban had adversely impacted upon his professional prospects at his age of 58 and his ability to support his two dependent children. He also claimed to have originally considered the $500,000 loan from the director of Astarra Capital to be a personal loan which did not influence his advice to clients; but conceded during the 2011 Tribunal hearing that in hindsight it ought to have been disclosed. After referring to RG 98 and noting his lack of previous contraventions; that the ASIC delegate did not find any dishonesty or intention to defraud; and Mr Caines' evidence of acquainting himself with relevant legislation and ASIC regulatory guidance, 198 Deputy President Handley varied ASIC's ban to three years, and also accepted an enforceable undertaking requiring Mr Caines to complete an ASICapproved professional education course and be subject to closer supervision by any new employers. 199 However these orders were set aside by the FCA, which remitted the matter back to the AAT for rehearing. 200 At the 2012 Tribunal hearing, Senior Member Letcher found no significant changes to warrant a variation of ASIC's five year ban.. The Tribunal found these breaches to have been established in over 40 instances, 203 and also noted with concern evidence from a former employee that Mr Tarrant had instructed his client advisors to 'Stress the need to educate the client and make them understand the concept of margin lending and how it can help build their strategy', and that he had also emphasised to his staff that clients could be changed from an 'assertive' to an 'aggressive' risk profile as they became 'more educated'. 204 In dismissing Mr Tarrant's arguments that the failings of regulators, auditors and other market participants to identify and intervene in the fraudulent operation of the ASF negated his obligations under the former s 945A of the Act, the Tribunal reasoned that whilst he was not on notice of the Trio Capital fraud, the high risk nature of the ASF ought to have been apparent to a prudent financial advisor. 205 The 207 relating to the determination of the length and banning and disqualification orders; 208 and that in its inquisitorial function, the Tribunal had been justified in asking its own questions of the various witnesses that gave evidence at the various hearings.
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D. Deterring insider trading
Three AAT cases affirmed s 920A banning orders imposed for insider trading. In two related cases, the intention to conduct a $5 million capital raising. In finding the s 1043A(1)(c) breaches to be substantiated, 221 Deutsch DP rejected Mr Batros' submission that by acting on an "execution only" basis and not providing any advice, he was a "mere cypher" for the trading in the MTA shares. 222 After also concluding that Mr Batros had consciously ignored instructions from senior personnel within his firm not to trade in MTA securities, and that he had neither acknowledged his misconduct nor expressed contrition, the Tribunal affirmed ASIC's five year ban.
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E. Deterring market manipulation
The maintenance of market integrity was a primary concern in Klusman and ASIC increasing his offer price for parcels of shares from $0.89 until he acquired a final parcel at $1.01. 229 ASIC determined this trading had created an artificial price for PTN's securities in breach of s 1041A. 230 However Hack DP concluded that as the trades were made at prices reflecting the prevailing forces of genuine supply and genuine demand, there was nothing 'artificial' about the trading prices merely because they exceeded the prices paid by other purchasers before and after the purchases by Mr Bond. were not genuine buyers and sellers seeking the most favourable price. 233 Furthermore, the delays themselves were often lengthy, some exceeding two years and many exceeding 12 months. A number of documents were not lodged at all'. 254 After considering the guidelines in RG 98, SM Fice concluded that whilst there was only minimal detriment to Lion's investors from Mr Hickie's breaches, the need for specific and general deterrence justified ASIC's two year ban.
G. Impact of personal bankruptcy
upholding his statutory obligations in professional practice when his personal financial management has been so poor?'. In all six of these cases the Tribunals were satisfied that the risk of future repetitions of the original misconduct was no longer present. However, in the cases reviewed in Part IV where ASIC's original banning orders were affirmed, as well as those where the variations of the lengths of the bans were relatively minor, the AAT nevertheless showed a firm approach in upholding compliance with financial services laws and standards of professional conduct.
ASIC's appeal of the original Tribunal decision. Given that ASIC has been successful in all of the AAT decisions on s 920A that it has appealed in the FCA, it is suggested that ASIC should continue to appeal future Tribunal decisions which it considers to have mis-construed the applicable legislation. Finally, whilst ten applicants proposed enforceable undertakings (involving the applicants submitting to audits and/or supervision, and undertaking further training), the Tribunal decisions reviewed above showed a general preference to either vary or affirm the original bans rather than accepting enforceable undertakings. Nevertheless, the final section below considers whether these examples of the willingness of banned applicants to be subject to supervision, audits and/or further training might form the basis of a new regulatory response option for ASIC in cases where it determines that a banning order against a financial services provider is not warranted -but nevertheless has concerns about the provider's competence and/or the likelihood of their future compliance with financial services laws. It is suggested that a minor addition to the 2017 Professional Standards Amendments might provide ASIC with this more flexible regulatory response option.
A. The impact of the 2017 Professional Standards amendments and scope for further reforms
As noted in Part I of this article, the 2017 Professional Standards Amendments will introduce significant changes to the educational standards to be a 'relevant provider'; 262 continuing professional development obligations and the requirements for 'provisional' relevant providers to be supervised until successfully completing a common entrance exam. It remains to be seen whether these new provisions will have the effect of lessening the scope for misconduct similar to the cases examined above to occur in the first instance -or conversely, whether these more extensive requirements may result in ASIC identifying more instances of misconduct and taking banning and/or other enforcement action after they come into effect on 1 January 2019.
Although many of the Tribunal decisions examined above noted that banning orders can protect the public from the risk of future misconduct by financial services providers, the question remains about From 1 January 2019, s 921B(4) will require 'provisional relevant providers' to be supervised until they complete their professional year and pass an exam set by the 'Standards Body'. The responsibilities of supervisors of provisional relevant providers will include approving in writing any SOAs to be provided to clients under s 921F(4); and assuming responsibility for advice provided by provisional relevant providers under s 921F(5). Section 910A will define a 'provisional relevant provider' as 'a relevant provider who is undertaking work and training in accordance with subsection 921B(4)'. It is suggested that further legislative amendments could be made to enable ASIC to designate a relevant provider as a 'provisional relevant provider' in cases where the provider has engaged in misconduct which ASIC deems not sufficiently serious to warrant a banning order, but still has concerns about the future 262 Under the amended form of s 910A which will apply from 1 January 2019, the term 'relevant provider' will include employees, directors and authorised representatives of financial services licensees who are authorised to provide personal advice to retail clients. For an overview of these reforms, see Robin Bowley ' Regulating the financial advice profession: An examination of recent developments in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom and recommendations for further reform ' (2017) [226] suitability about the provider. This "designation" power could also be used in conjunction with s 920A banning orders -for example through designating a relevant provider as a "provisional relevant provider" for a specified period upon the expiry of a period of banning.
This suggested reform would provide three key benefits. First, a relevant provider designated as 'provisional' could still continue working within the financial services industry, albeit under supervision. Secondly, it would afford some measure of protection to consumers and investors through subjecting the relevant provider designated as 'provisional' to the supervision requirements under the new s 921F which will apply from 1 January 2019. Thirdly, it would provide a mechanism for assessing the provisional relevant provider's knowledge, skills and attitudes through the requirement to George's extenuating personal circumstances contributed to this misconduct); and Amargianitakis and ASIC [2015] AATA 720 (where the adviser failed to properly assess his clients' financial objectives before they invested in high-risk property financing schemes).
With the major changes to the regulation of professional standards in the financial services industry coming into effect from 1 January 2019, which could well lead to increased enforcement action by ASIC, it is recommended that serious consideration should be given to enacting the reforms suggested above in order to further enhance the flexibility and effectiveness of ASIC's regulatory toolkit. 264 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 43(1)
